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Using bilateral trade data of countries from 2000 to 2007, this paper contributes to the 
empirical literature on the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in global trade. 
The existing literature has focused on how IPRs in the destination country affect 
exports from a source country. In this paper, we add an additional dimension: the level 
of technology of the exporting country (LT). This is quite important for distinguishing 
the impact of IPRs on the exports of developed and developing countries, since the 
technology levels vary across countries at different stages of development and 
intellectual property rights better protect exports that are technologically advanced 
than exports that are imitative and potentially infringing. By factoring in the level of 
technology (LT), our empirical analysis makes the case that IPRs can act as barrier to 
exports from the South, especially the rapidly catching-up economies, and thus as one 
source for the middle-income trap phenomenon.  
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Under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), free trade has been 
promoted as a vehicle for world economic development. The WTO also regulates and 
provides guidelines for intellectual property rights (hereinafter referred to as IPRs) 
through the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement. 
This Agreement has thus far represented the most extensive multilateral agreement 
towards the global harmonization of IPRs by setting out minimum standards for 
protection across member countries. These standards are also evolving through TRIPS-
Plus provisions incorporated in recent bilateral and regional trade agreements. 
Alongside these developments, we have also observed the increased globalization of 
technology in terms of increased international patent filings and export sales. 
The theory and empirical research linking trade and IPRs has focused on the 
extent to which IPRs in the destination (or importing) country attract exports from the 
source country, controlling for other determinants of trade (see Maskus and Penubarti 
1995; Smith 1999 and 2001; McCalman 2005; Awokuse and Yin 2009; and Ivus 2010). 
However, to determine the extent to which the expansion and enforcement of global 
IPRs has contributed to export growth requires that we break down the impacts by 
economic development, since developed and developing countries have critical 
differences in IPR systems (see Deere 2009) as well as varying levels of technological 
development. Exporting firms in the developed world have long been accustomed to a 
relatively advanced IPR system in their home market; in that regard, few of them 
needed to be equipped for the global institutional changes. On the other hand, many 
firms in the developing world have faced the challenge of meeting the conditions 
established by their nations’ bounded commitments to TRIPS. Most exporting firms in 
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the developing world are likely to incur higher costs in order to adapt to TRIPS 
obligations, even though TRIPS does not necessitate high standards but minimum 
requirements. In addition, stricter IPR laws and enforcement in developed countries 
might curb imports from developing countries, as the latters’ exports would be excluded 
if they are found to be too imitative and infringing. In contrast, if a firm is innovative 
and commands a high level of technology, it would not face such difficulties in 
penetrating markets with higher levels of IPR protection. Thus, the effects of IPRs in the 
importing markets on the exports of source countries should depend upon the innovative 
capacity of the source country firms. 
In this paper, we study the interaction effect of a destination country’s IPR 
protection and a source country’s level of technology on the level of bilateral trade 
between the source and destination countries. We measure the level of technology using 
a country’s patents (which will be discussed more fully in the paper). This is the first 
paper, to our knowledge, which studies how the innovative capacity of the source 
country influences the relationship between IPRs and trade, and how foreign IPRs 
influence the marginal contribution of technology to export performance. Furthermore, 
previous empirical studies have focused on trade flows either by individual exporter 
countries or for a small number of bilateral trading partners. This paper is the first to use 
a large pooled panel dataset consisting of bilateral trade flows among more than 70 
countries for the recent period (2000 to 2007). 1  With this dataset, we conduct 
comparative analyses by income groups; for example, trade between North (developed 
countries) and South (developing countries), South and South, and North and North. 
                                           
1 For most developing countries and economies in transition, the year 2000 was their deadline to 
comply with TRIPS. Thus, 2000 is treated as the initial year for measuring the effects of IPRs. 
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The paper finds some quite interesting results. First, when both the level of 
technology of the source country and the intellectual property strength of the destination 
country are taken into account jointly as an interaction term, the effect of an importer’s 
IPR on a source country’s export is highly dependent on the exporting country’s LT. In 
other words, as an importing country’s level of IPR increases, the net marginal effect of 
technology on exports decreases. This result is especially prominent in the case of 
exports from developing countries to the developed countries, but not so in the case of 
exports from the latter to the former. This asymmetry implies that the destination 
country’s level of IPRs can act as a trade barrier, diminishing the exports from 
developing countries; in particular, the export growth of countries whose technological 
levels are currently emerging are likely to be impeded by the recent increased 
stringency of IP laws and policies. 
However, exports from the developed countries are not thwarted by the IPR 
systems of their trading partners in the South. These contrasting results may support the 
view that the current IPRs system has a distributional bias in that a stronger global IPR 
regime favors the expansion of developed country exports relative to that of developing 
country exports.  Our results show that, conditional on the levels of technology of 
different countries, the elasticity of exports with respect to IPRs is higher for developed 
countries than it is for developing, and that it can be even negative for some developing 
countries who are catching-up rapidly. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a conceptual 
background for the paper and derives hypotheses. Section 3 describes the empirical 
method and the data employed. Section 4 discusses the empirical findings, along with 




2. Conceptual Background and Hypothesis 
2. 1.  TRIPs and International Trade 
TRIPS regulates minimum standards for domestic IPRs. Most developed 
economies have already surpassed the minimum criteria for TRIPS (Deere 2009 and 
Park 2008). However, for developing countries (or low technology exporters), higher 
global minimum IPR standards may be akin to a tax, in the sense that they increase 
R&D expenses for net technology borrowers who incur higher royalties and licensing 
fees (Glass and Saggi 2002, Siebeck et al 1990). To meet higher standards of IPRs, 
developing country exporters face higher production costs in order to access global 
information and enter into global markets (Helpman 1993; Lai and Qiu 2003). Moreover, 
as Auriol and Biancini (2010) and Odagiri et al. (2010) show, tighter global IPRs, 
particularly in developed country markets, can act as a barrier to the entry of developing 
country exports into advanced, developed country markets, particularly if developing 
country products are found to be infringing or too imitative under the IPR regime of the 
destination market, and thus cannot legally enter those markets. For developing country 
exporters that do enter the developed country markets, they would still face higher legal 
and administrative costs of procuring intellectual property rights, such as patents, as 
well as enforcing rights and contesting IP claims. Thus, two key burdens for developing 
economies exist under TRIPS. First, the domestic costs of establishing an IPR system in 
accordance with TRIPS have been rather exorbitant to the developing world (see Finger 
2002 and Schneider 2005).2 Second, the global transactions costs of legal fees and 
                                           
2 For example, Schneider (2005) finds this implication in her empirical results. She also argues 
that strong domestic IPRs may hurt innovations in developing countries since their innovations 
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litigation costs dampen the benefits of exporting if any dispute arises.  
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
In fact, the WTO’s dispute settlement body has overseen numerous TRIPS-
related disputes, where so far 32 official cases have been heard since the inception of 
the WTO.3 Most cases (26 disputes) have been initiated by developed countries, 
primarily the United States and the European Union, and developing countries are 
involved in 16 disputes. 4  Moreover, firm-to-firm 5  and national authority-to-firm 
disputes have been growing rapidly. For example, as Figure 1 shows, the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (U.S. ITC) has overseen a quadrupling of IPR-related 
disputes against foreign imports during the past two decades.6 Indeed, more American 
firms have complained against IPR violations than against unfair dumping, as the falling 
trend in traditional trade remedies such as anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duties 
                                                                                                                           
are imitation or adaptive in nature. 
3 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm, last accessed March, 2013.   
4 Unlike the cases against developed countries, all cases (10 cases) targeted against developing 
countries were settled out of the court or ruled against the developing countries. Firms in the 
developing countries tend to prefer out-of-court settlements or summary judgments due to 
concerns about litigation and legal costs.  
5 Within the border of the United States, firm-to-firm IPR-related disputes have drastically 
increased by over 100% in the past two decades, and patent-related cases have increased by 
about 150% from 1,224 cases in 1988 to 2,909 cases in 2008 (The U.S Courts, 2010). 
6 The United States International Trade Commission (ITC) regulates IPR infringement by law 
with remedial actions called ‘Section 337 investigation,’ which directs U.S. Customs to block 
infringing imports from entering the United States market. The ITC can institute cease-and-
desist proceedings against imports and named importers and other persons engaged in unfair 
acts that violate Section 337. Along with the United States, other developed countries such as 
the European Union (EU), Canada, and Japan also have strong IPR enforcement systems within 
their borders to block those infringing IPR imports. In the case of the EU, the European 
Commission enforces a powerful IPR protection system against imports that potentially violate 
IPRs through their Taxation and Customs Union office; IPR rights-holders can request that such 
imports be detained and under investigation. The actions can be requested on a national or on an 
EU basis. The number of requests for such actions has increased from nearly 1,000 applications 
in 2000 to over 18,000 in 2010 (European Commission, 2010). 
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(CVD) appear to indicate.7 These developments indicate that the burden of global legal 
costs is quite real for exporters, especially those from developing countries. 
 
2. 2.  Level of Technology and Exports 
In addition to the world trade regime including TRIPs, the technology level of 
exporters (LT) can also influence the growth of trade.  We assess a country’s level of 
technology by examining its patents; for example, patents granted abroad or in the U.S.  
These patents capture a country’s production of new technologies and hence serve as a 
useful indicator of the technological capabilities of firms in the country.  These 
capabilities affect the possibilities of firms to capture global market share, given market 
conditions (including the level of IPRs).  For developed economies, their level of 
technology has been a driving force behind their exports (Vernon 1996, Krugman 1979, 
Dollar 1986). Exporting firms in the developed world that engage in innovations exhibit 
greater export performance (Romer 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Young 1991; 
Smith et al 2002; Becker and Egger 2007). Furthermore, awards of IPRs, such as 
patents for innovations, help signal product quality and thus stimulate market demand.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
However, as shown in Table 1, the levels of technology (using patent data) vary 
between developed and developing countries, which raises questions about the 
derivation of economic benefits from TRIPS, such as the ability to gain export markets. 
In other words, is the global system of IPRs designed in favor of the exports of 
                                           
7 Note that the spikes in dumping investigations in 1992 and 2002 (and the slight rise in 2007-8) 
in Figure 1 may be due to recessions. Dumping complaints tend to be highly cyclical, increasing 
dramatically during recessions. 
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countries with high levels of technology, LT?  Table 1 shows the degree of differences 
in levels of technology using a country’s patents granted abroad (i.e., to measure its 
acquisition of world patent rights) and a country’s U.S. patents granted (i.e., to measure 
its unique inventions), as well as gaps in IPR protection between two income groups: 
developed and developing countries. Both in a relative (mean-wise) and absolute sense, 
the IPR gaps are smaller than the LT gaps between the two groups.8 The IPR gaps have 
become gradually narrowed since 2000. In fact, the statistical differences in mean IPR 
values between the two groups have largely disappeared since 2005, the deadline year 
for implementing the TRIPS agreement by committed developing countries.  
In fact, developing economies’ products tend to be imitative in nature or 
invented (or re-invented) around existing products. Consequently, most of the exports of 
developing economies have not been products or processes protected by their own 
patent rights; they may be protected by a lower form of IPRs, such as utility models 
(namely petty patents), but not by regular patents (Kim et al. 2012). The implication 
here is that until a developing country approaches the technology levels of developed 
countries, strong IPRs in the exporting markets may serve as an obstacle to its exports. 
 
2. 3.  Interaction of IPR protection and the Level of Technology in Exports 
The theoretical literature thus far has identified two opposing effects of stronger 
IPRs in a destination country on the exports of a source country:  a market-expansion 
effect and a market-power effect (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995). On the one hand, the 
                                           
8 The gap between the two groups in absolute mean value is huge. For example, in the 
developing country group, the mean LTs (as measured by foreign patent counts) for the years 
2000-2001 and 2006-2007 are 96.41 and 226.31 respectively. The corresponding values in the 
developed group are 12279.73 and 17338.11 respectively. How we measure the strength of IPRs 
will be discussed in section 3. 
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exporters perceive an expansion in their market due to a reduction in imitation by local 
firms. The demand curve for their exports shifts out in the destination market. On the 
other hand, stronger IPRs in the destination country increase the exporters’ market 
power, reducing the elasticity of the demand they face and thus the volume of exports. 
Hence, empirical analysis is typically pursued to see which effect dominates.9  
However, one channel not analyzed thus far in the literature is the feedback 
effect of foreign IPRs and the exporter’s level of technology on the exportability – or 
more specifically, on the profitability of exports – of the source country. The existing 
literature implicitly assumes that a source country has a sufficiently high level of 
technology that strong (or weak) foreign IPRs mainly affect the incentives of exporters 
to increase (or decrease) the volume of their exports (i.e., to weigh the market expansion 
and market power effects of stronger IPRs abroad). For countries where exporters do 
not have high levels of technology or innovative capacity, TRIPS-like standards in 
importing countries could dampen exports from these countries.10 
For example, South Korea is currently a strong exporter, but its entry into the 
U.S. market has been marred by patent disputes between U.S. and Korean firms since 
the 1980s. A most noteworthy case was the ban on Samsung’s computer chip exports 
imposed by the U.S. ITC for violating the patent rights of Texas Instruments.11 Thus, 
due to IP-induced barriers, developing countries could lose out on opportunities that 
exporting to developed markets provide, given that these latter markets account for the 
                                           
9 See Taylor (1993), Maskus and Penubarti (1995), and Smith (1999, 2001).  
10 The previous studies present mostly the perspective of developed countries (i.e., leading LT 
countries) on the adequacy of IPR protection for their exports in destination markets. For 
example, Maskus and Penubarti (1995) and Smith (1999) estimate the sensitivity of U.S. 
exports (or exports of OECD economies) to the level of IPRs across export markets using 
industry data, concluding that weak IPR levels are a barrier to U.S (or OECD) exports. 
11 For details, see Lee and Kim (2010). 
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bulk of world markets and trading opportunities. The developing country exporters may 
find themselves confined to the technologically low-end of the market, which confers 
relatively smaller benefits. A more interesting aspect of this observation is that the 
possibly negative impact of this interaction between the levels of IPR protection and 
technology would be greater for those developing countries that are catching up rapidly, 
and thus command a certain level of technological capability and are active in exporting 
to the markets of developed countries, than for those developing countries with very 
low technological capabilities and thus weak export performances. 
While the existing literature has not touched upon this interaction between IPRs 
and technological capabilities and its implications for exporting, this study explicitly 
considers this new channel of the impacts of IPRs on trade, namely the direct impact of 




 To illustrate our reasoning about the interaction effects, let us assume the 
following linear representation, allowing for some interaction between the source 
country’s level of technology (LT) and the destination country’s level of intellectual 
property rights (IPR). The value of exports (E) can then be considered to take the 
following functional form: 
 
E(IPR, LT, .) IPR + LT IPR×LT + …                  (1) 
 
for which we can test whether = 0. It is likely that  > 0; namely, that exporting is a 
positive function of the level of technology. However, a priori, and are ambiguous, 
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since the effect of IPRs on exports depend upon a balancing of the market power effects 
and market expansion effects of IPRs. Moreover, the cross effects of IPRs and the level 
of technology could in principle be either negative or positive. But the key advantage of 
having this interaction term is that the marginal impact of IPRs on exports is no longer 
simply but the sum of two terms, namely LT, which represents the direct impacts 
(and the interaction impacts (LT). 
   There are several possible cases to consider depending upon the signs of and 
However, the actual regressions, as will be shown later, all indicate  to be negative 
or sometimes insignificant.  Thus, let us focus our discussion on this interesting and 
dominant case of < 0. In this case, it is noteworthy that for some high ranges of the 






 = LT < 0, even if the direct impact of IPR is positive ( >0). 
This possibility implies that the impact of IPRs might vary according to how much a 
country exports IP-sensitive products, which depend on the country’s level of 
technology (i.e. patents). For a developing country with a low level of technology, its 
export items have not reached that status, as it exports less sophisticated products. In 
contrast, a small number of countries called “emerged or newly emerging economies,” 
such as Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, China, India, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, and several 
ASEAN countries, can produce technology-intensive products; their technology levels 
(LTs) are still low in comparison to developed countries but are relatively highest 
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among developing countries.12 For them, strong IPR enforcement in the destination 
countries may act as a barrier against their exports into the markets of rich countries. 
We can also gain a similar perspective by focusing on the impacts of changes in 
the level of technology of the exporters. Raising technological capabilities is one of the 
most important means by which exporters can expand their exports in foreign markets, 
and this is particularly pressing for the exporters in the South. However, the net impact 
of an additional increase in the level of technology of exporters might be small when 
there is a substantial negative interaction effect with the level of IPR protection in the 
destination countries. In other words, the marginal effect of the level of technology on 






, which could be negative, even with a 
positive direct impact (if is negative and IPR takes on a sufficiently high value. 
This case is a clear-cut example of the entry barrier effect of IPRs which could frustrate 
the effort of the middle income countries to try to enter developed country markets by 
raising the technological standard of their products through innovation. This implies 
that one source of the so-called ‘middle income trap’ (Yusuf and Nabeshima 2009; 
World Bank 2010; Lee 2013) is weak exporting by the middle income countries into the 
markets of developed countries due to the latter’s high IPR standards. 
The concept of the middle-income trap refers to a situation in which middle-
income countries face a slowdown of growth as they get caught between low-wage 
manufacturing and high-wage innovation because their wage rates are too high to 
                                           
12  On average, $7.57 billion of technology-intensive products (by the World Bank’s 
classification) are exported from the developing countries, while $ 30.13 billion of them are 
exported from the developed during 2000 ~ 2007 (see more details in the Appendix). However, 
the amount of technology-intensive exports from the developing countries might be 
overestimated due to the presence of multinational corporations (MNCs) whose subsidiaries 
engage in exporting. 
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compete with low-wage exporters and their level of technological capability is too low 
to allow them to compete with the advanced countries. One important way out of the 
trap is obviously to enhance their level of technologies (Lee 2013). However, the 
negative interaction between LT and IPRs implies that such efforts are impeded by the 
IPR protection of their destination countries. 
From the above discussions, we now draw some research questions regarding the 
effects of IPRs and the level of technology on export behavior across countries. In 
particular, we suggest the following hypotheses for empirical testing:  
(1) The possibly negative interaction effects between the level of technology and IPR 
protection would be more significant for exports from the South to the North than 
for exports from the North to the South.  
(2) The impacts of the IPRs of destination countries on exports from abroad should 
vary depending upon the level of technology of the source countries. Specifically, 
the IPR effects on exports may be negative for those developing economies (the 
South) whose own level of technology is relatively high (i.e., ∂E∂IPR =  α +  γLT <0), as strong IPRs may impede the entry of exports from countries that are 
catching up technologically. 
(3) The direct impact (of the level of technology on exports should be positive, but 
this positive impact may be offset by the negative interaction between the level of 
technology (LT) and the IPR protection of importing countries. This negative 





3. Empirical Framework 
3. 1 Methodology 
 Since we have many bilateral trading relations among countries, we employ 
standard gravity type models to explain the bilateral trade flows, in which the aggregate 
supply of the exporting country and the aggregate demand of the importing country are 
related to variables measuring transportation and transaction costs, along with other 
bilateral specific factors.13 
The popular, extensive use of the gravity model suggests that it would be an 
appropriate empirical framework here to estimate the effects of patents, as a proxy for 
the level of technology (LT), and their interactions with IPRs.14 Let us first start with a 
canonical version of the gravity estimation equation: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  λ𝑖 + λ𝑗 + λ𝑖𝑗 + 𝜙𝑙𝑛 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡          (2) 
 
where 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes real bilateral exports from country i to country j at time t and ln the 
natural logarithm operator. GDP𝑖𝑡 and GDP𝑗𝑡 denote the real gross domestic products of 
each country. λ𝑖, λ𝑗 and δ𝑡 are fixed exporter, importer, and time effects, respectively. λ𝑖 captures any exporter specific time-invariant effects such as the initial economic 
development of a country (e.g., initial conditions pertaining to political, cultural, trade-
related infrastructure, or other institutional characteristics) and unobserved factor 
                                           
13 See Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; Anderson 2009; Baltagi et al 2003; and Fidrmuc 2009 
for discussions of gravity models. 
14 Many IPRs and patent-related studies at the country-level have used also used gravity-type 
models (see Maskus and Penubarti 1995, Maskus 1998, Ginarte and Park 1997, Fink and Braga 
1999, Glass and Saggi 2000 and 2001, Smith 2001, MacCalman 2005, Schneider 2005, and 
Awokuse and Yin 2010). 
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endowment variables.15 λ𝑗 accounts for any of these characteristics of the importing 
country. Time specific effects, δ𝑡, control for common business cycle shocks (e.g. 
global supply and demand shocks, information technology booms or busts, natural 
resource price and demand increases in major emerging countries, such as China, Brazil 
and India). λ𝑖𝑗 are the bilateral-pair fixed effects which control for all time-invariant 
factors, such as transportation costs (distance, remoteness) and other non-observable 
time-invariant factors between the two countries.16 The country-pair effects need not be 
symmetric but differ depending on the direction of trade (λ𝑖𝑗 ≠ λ𝑗𝑖 ); for example, 
country i may be a former colony of country j, but not vice versa. 
 Next, we augment the standard gravity model with the level of intellectual 
property rights and the level of technology variables: 
                  𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  λ𝑖 + λ𝑗 + λ𝑖𝑗 + 𝜙𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡                                       + 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡  +  𝛾(𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑗𝑡 × 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡    (3) 
 
                                           
15 These factors are likely to be highly correlated with the gravity model variables (GDP, 
distance, language). Estimations which do not include them will have an endogeneity bias due 
to omitted variables, as long as the omitted variables are correlated with the bilateral trade or 
other explanatory variables. 
16 Our panel data method provides some general corrections introduced by country specific 
effects. Since our panel has relatively short time spans (4 periods), using these fixed effects with 
GLS (Generalized Least Squares) should be adequate to address serially correlated idiosyncratic 
errors (Baltagi and Wu 1999); however, omitted unobserved factors that have been bilaterally 
established can lead to bias (Baltagi et al 2003, Carrere 2006). For example, more often than not, 
bilateral or regional FTAs that include bilateral investment and IPR-related agreements require 
member countries to meet higher IPR standards than those set by TRIPS. Especially, 
technology-rich countries ratchet up IP protection through these agreements with extra 
provisions (the so-called TRIPS plus provisions) that go beyond the minimum requirements of 
TRIPS. Existence of these provisions may produce a bilateral bias for member countries to 
apply more stringent standards, which say limit the use of existing TRIPS flexibilities or public 




where LT denotes the measure of the technology level referred to earlier. Our key 
variables of interest in equation (3) are the exporter’s level of technology, the importer’s 
intellectual property protection, and their interaction.   
We expect the signs of the coefficients for lnIPR, lnLT, and lnIPR×lnLT to be 
in accordance with our discussion in section 2. First, the expected coefficient of 
intellectual property protection is ambiguous, as it depends on whether the market 
expansion or market power effect of the destination country’s IPRs dominates. Second, 
the expected coefficient for the level of technology is positive since product quality and 
productivity should stimulate export growth and be especially important for developing 
country exporters to break into advanced country markets. Lastly, the interaction term 
will determine the interplay between the importer’s IPR and exporter’s level of 
technology, and will thereby be the basis for testing our hypotheses. To the extent that 
the importer’s IPR impedes the exports of low technology products, we expect the 
coefficient of the interaction term to be negative for developing countries (and 
ambiguous for developed countries). That is, a large negative value of in equation (3) 
could result in IPRs having a net negative effect on exports: 






depending on the level of technology (namely if LT .  
 
3.2 Data Description 
Our trade data are from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database (UNCOMTRADE). The export values have been converted to constant 2000 
U.S. dollars. The U.S. import price index from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics is 
used as a proxy for the change in export prices in the world. 
 
17 
As mentioned earlier, we measure LT using patents. We use two main versions17: 
the first measures the level of technology in terms of diffusion; that is, the exporter’s 
patents granted abroad (i.e., summed across all countries). The reasoning is that 
innovations that are high in technology content would be valuable to patent worldwide. 
This variable measures, therefore, a country’s level of technology in terms of the global 
breadth of its innovations. However, the sum of all patents granted abroad is not a 
unique count of innovations; that is, the same innovation may be patented in multiple 
countries. Thus, as an alternative measure of the level of technology, we examine 
patents granted in the U.S. This would be a count of unique innovations. The reason for 
considering U.S. patents granted, rather than domestic (home-country) patents, is that 
more highly valuable innovations are patented abroad, particularly in a large market like 
the United States. Another advantage of using U.S. patents granted is that we 
incorporate a common patent granting standard. The disadvantage of examining patents 
granted in just one country is that we do not capture the marketability of technologies 
worldwide, particularly since exporters will likely seek patent protection in those 
markets where they expect to sell their products; thus, patents granted worldwide help 
to capture the trade-related technology levels of a country.  Hence, by using our two 
measures of LT, we can both exploit their strengths and offset their weaknesses. Patent 
data are from the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO) and the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO).  In either case, LT is calculated as the moving average of 
the current year and previous year, so as to smooth out cyclical movements. 
Our measure of IPR is from the Global Competitiveness Report published by 
                                           
17 European Patent Office and Trilateral patents are also a potential measure for LT at the 
country level. We discuss these alternative measures in our section on robustness checks. 
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the World Economic Forum (WEF). This index is based on a survey of business 
executives in each reporting country. The survey asks for a rating between 1 and 7, 
where higher numbers reflect a stronger perception of IPR strength and enforcement. 
There are some limitations with directly capturing the statutory characteristics of 
country’s IPRs regime due to any experiential or perception errors on the part of survey 
participants. Despite this limitation, this index has an extensive coverage of countries 
and is important to the extent that it is the perceptions of IPR regimes that influence 
exporters’ behavior.18  
Some sample statistics of IPRs and LT are provided in Table 2, broken down by 
percentile values and development level. Generally, developed countries have a larger 
number of patents abroad and stronger domestic IPR regimes, while some of the 
emerging economies (e.g. China, India, Ukraine) have higher levels of technology 
relative to their stage of economic development (see more details in the Appendix). 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
The nominal GDPs are from the International Monetary Fund’s World 
Economic Outlook database (2010) and are converted into real GDPs (in U.S. dollars) 
using GDP deflators. The data on bilateral trade costs were compiled using the gravity 
dataset of CEPII (Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales- 
                                           
18 However, we also use the Ginarte and Park (1997) index of patent rights (based on statutory 
and case laws and regulations) to check for robustness. The initial years of GP-IPR index (2000) 
are used and treated as time invariant data in our regression since its time series are limited for 
our period of analysis 2000-2007 (i.e., the GP-IPR index has only two of those years: 2000 and 
2005). The use of the initial year allows us to complement the WEF IPR index while avoiding 
multi-collinearity between the two IPR measures. 
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Institute for Research on the International Economy). Bilateral distance is calculated 
using latitudes and longitudes of economic centers to calculate the great circle distances. 
The common language, border, and former colonial link are dummy variables, 
indicating “1” if two countries commonly share a geographical and cultural adjacency, 
and “0” otherwise. The bilateral trade dataset used for the regression analysis consists of 
33 developed countries and 42 developing countries. Table 3 provides some descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in our regressions, for the full sample and for samples 
broken down by income group. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Individual and Interaction effects between LT and IPR 
Table 4 presents three ways of estimating our model using data for all countries. 
First, pooled OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) is presented in columns (1) ~ (3) as a basic 
model. Second, GLS (Generalized Least Squares) with country effects using 
exporter/importer dummies and year dummies is presented in columns (4) ~ (6). Third, 
panel fixed effect (FE) estimation, applied with two specific effects (bilateral-pair 
effects and year dummies), is presented in columns (7) and (8).  
We first present our results using total world patents granted as our measure of 
a country’s level of technology (see columns (1) ~ (8) of Table 4) and then use patents 
granted in the U.S. as our measure of LT (see columns (9) ~ (13), which show the GLS 
and FE estimates). Throughout, the coefficient estimates of GDP of both the exporter 
and importer and other control variables for bilateral-pair relations are statistically 
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significant and positive, whereas the coefficient estimate of distance is statistically 
significant and negative. This is generally consistent with previous studies. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
In the pooled sample of developed and developing countries, the effect of an 
importer’s IPR on exports turns out to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level (see Table 4, first row). This result indicates that exporters are motivated to export 
more to countries with a stronger IPR system, notwithstanding the level of an exporter’s 
own level of economic development. These results are also confirmed in the previous 
literature (Maskus and Penubarti 1995; Fink and Braga 1999; Smith 2001; 
Rafiquzzaman 2002; Park and Lippoldt 2003; Awokuse and Yin 2009; Ivus 2010).  
In addition, the effect of the exporter’s technology level (LT) on its exports is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level across most of the specifications – 
the exception being the two cases of positive but statistical insignificance in columns (4) 
and (7). In general, these initial results show that an increase in the level of technology 
(measured by the quantity of patents) is positively associated with an expansion in 
exports, which agrees with several previous empirical studies (e.g., Greenhalgh et al 
1994; Montobbio and Rampa 2005; Cassiman et al 2010). Our findings are also 
qualitatively similar if we use patents granted in the U.S. as our measure of the level of 
technology (LT), as shown in columns (9) ~ (13) of Table 4. Thus, whether we 
characterize a country’s technology level in terms of its innovations or global diffusion, 
its technological activity is an importer driver of its exporting. These two findings are 
robust even if we control for the initial level of patent laws and regulations in the 
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exporter and importer countries (see the EX-GPIPR-2000 and IM-GPIPR variables in 
Table 4, columns (3) and (6)). 
Now, it is important to note that the coefficients on the interaction term 
(lnIPR × lnLT) are statistically significant and negative in all the models except the one 
in column (13), regardless of whether the models include country-effects or bilateral-
pair effects.19  To better understand and interpret this result, we now proceed to the 
sets of regressions by different income groups. Our bilateral panel consisting of 
exporters as source countries and importers as destination markets allows us to conduct 
a comparative analysis by breaking up both the source and destination countries by 
income group (refer to the notes on ‘Direction of Trade Flows’ in Table 5). 
Table 5 reports the results of separating the sample between developed (the 
North) and developing (the South) countries, using specifications with interaction terms. 
We use the World Bank definition of high-income countries to categorize the developed 
countries (see the Appendix for details). In the upper part, Columns (1) ~ (4) show 
estimates for the exports of the North to the World, and columns (5) ~ (8) show 
estimates for the exports of the South to the World. The models in the lower part of the 
table, or columns 9 to 16, show the various 2 by 2 combinations of the South and North, 
either as source or destination countries, such as exports from the North to North, North 
to South, South to North, and South to South. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
                                           
19 We have also controlled for importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects, instead of having 
merely importer and exporter fixed effects. The rationale is that there may be time varying 
‘multilateral resistance terms’ reflecting transportation costs and other border effects which 
prevent price arbitrage (see Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)). The qualitative results are quite 




First, we note that in both the cases of North to World and South to World, the 
interaction term has significantly negative coefficients. Next, when we turn to the 2 by 2 
cases, we notice importantly that the same coefficients are still negative but not 
significant in the cases of North to South and South to South. In contrast, the interesting 
cases are the North exporting to the North and the South exporting to the North, where 
the interaction term’s coefficients are negative and significant. This pattern confirms the 
first hypothesis proposed in the preceding section, namely that the possibly negative 
interaction effects between the level of technology and IPR protection would be more 
serious for the exports of the South to the North, than for the exports of the North to the 
South. 
Since we are using log-log specifications, the interaction effect has an elasticity 
interpretation between real exports and the level of IPR; that is, the partial effect of IPR 
on E (holding other variables constant) is 
 
 %∆E𝑖𝑗 ≈ [α + γln(LT𝑖)]%∆IPRj                             (4) 
 
Now, if the coefficient of the interaction term,γ, is negative, this means that the positive 
effect of IPR protection alone (α) is offset by the negative interaction effect. This 
equation is plotted in Figures 2A for the case of exports from the South to the North. In 
this figure, we plot the estimated elasticity of exports with respect to IPRs, conditional 
on the level of technology; specifically for two values: a high level of LT and a low 
level of LT of the exporting countries, where the high value is one standard deviation of 
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LT above its mean and the low value is one standard deviation of LT below its mean.20 
The Figure shows that the impact of a higher level of IPR protection in the North on 
exports from countries in the South depends on the exporters’ level of technology. For 
the Southern exporter with a low level of LT, a stronger IPR still helps promote the 
growth of its exports because the negative interaction effect is quantitatively too small 
to fully offset the positive effects of IPRs on exports. In contrast, for Southern exporters 
with a higher LT, the negative interaction effects are large enough to more than fully 
offset the positive and direct impact of IPR, and thus the net impacts are almost zero, 
making the slope of the elasticity curve very flat. 
 
 [Figures 2A and 2B here] 
 
The estimated elasticities of exports with respect to IPR, evaluated at the mean 
levels of technology, suggest a distributional bias; namely, that global IPR reforms 
primarily raise the share of Northern exports in the world.  For example, based on 
estimates in columns 1 and 5, the elasticity of world exports with respect to IPR is 0.898 
for developed countries, using the mean value ln LT = 1.75 (based on Table 1).  This 
elasticity is lower, namely 0.68, for developing countries, using the mean value ln LT = 
                                           
20 When there is an interaction effect, the appropriate evaluation of the effect should be tested 
with various interesting values of the concerned variables, such as the mean value, or the lower 
and upper quartiles in the sample. However, in order to show the interaction effect in a more 
precise but concise way, we compute the slope of ln(E) on ln(IPR) while holding the value of 
ln(LT) constant at either a high value of LT (one standard deviation (SD) above the mean) or a 
low value (one standard deviation (SD) below the mean) (Wooldridge 2009). The virtue of using 
this statistical technique of analyzing the interaction effect according to the standard deviation 
changes in the level of LT (or IPR), as centered on a certain percentile value (the mean in our 




1.22.  Hence, a given percentage strengthening of IPRs increases Northern exports 
relatively more than Southern exports. 
 Let us next turn to the other side of coin and examine the impact of an exporters’ 
level of technology on exports. The negative interaction between the level of technology 
and IPR protection implies that the positive export-promoting effects of LT would be 
substantially diminished. Actually, in the case of exports from the South to the North, 
the elasticity of exports with respect to the level of technology is negative for high IPR 
destinations, as shown in Figure 2B. Thus, the net effects of LT turn out to be negative 
for the case where the South exports to developed countries with high levels of IPR 
protection. In contrast, for Southern exports to developed countries with lower levels of 
IPR protection, the net effect seems to be negligible, given a very flat slope for the 
elasticity curve.  
Analyzing sample percentiles from the perspective of exporters, we can graph 
the optimal or appropriate levels of IPR at which the growth of technological 
innovations promotes exports. These appropriate levels differ sharply between 
developed and developing economies.21 For example, in developed countries, export 
growth continues to respond positively to an increase in the importer’s IPR until 
approximately the 80th percentile of the importer’s IPR level is reached. In contrast, the 
exports of developing countries are suppressed by foreign IPRs from even low levels of 
the importer’s IPR strength; that is, at around the 10th percentile. 
Overall, these graphs and estimation results confirm our twin (second and third) 
hypotheses that the effect of IPR (or LT) on exports varies under different levels of LT 
                                           
21 In other words, with a percentile analysis of the interaction effects, we can empirically 
identify the optimal levels of IPR for the case of the North or the South as exporters to the 
World as the destination. See Kim et al. (2012) for a similar argument. 
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(or IPR). Jointly, these hypotheses imply that IPR protection in the North may act as a 
barrier to the entry of Southern exports, especially of those exports whose level of 
technology LT is relatively high. In other words, the stringent protection of IPRs by the 
more advanced destination countries enables their domestic producers to exclude the 
products of foreign exporters whose levels of technology are catching-up. In reality, 
many cases exist that support this empirical finding. For example, incumbent firms in 
the North often resort to legal suit or disputes over IPRs in order to edge out 
competitors whose technological capabilities are growing and are a threat in their 
markets. As pointed out earlier, when Korea was still a developing country in the 1980s, 
Samsung Electronics had emerged as a rapidly growing competitor in the computer 
chips market. The U.S incumbent company, Texas Instruments, pursued patent 
infringement cases against Samsung that involved 10 of their patents on dynamic 
random access memory (DRAM). After the U.S. ITC had initiated extensive litigation 
and imposed a restriction on Samsung’s exports, Samsung in the end agreed to renew a 
patent licensing agreement worth more than US$ 1 billion as part of a settlement with 
Texas Instruments.22  
These results are in sharp contrast to the case of the North’s exports to the 
South, for which case the coefficients of the interaction term between the North’s LT 
and the South’s IPR are not significant. This implies that IPR protection in the South 
does not interfere with Northern exporting. This asymmetry implies that developed 
country exporters are possibly the major beneficiaries of a strong IPR system, as created 
by TRIPS in the current world trading system, and that their own IPR regimes work as a 
mechanism to diminish the ability of developing countries to access their markets by 
                                           
22 For details, see Lee and Kim (2010) in Odagiri et al. (2012). 
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enhancing the level of technology of developing economies. In other words, the 
stronger Northern IPR system appears to obstruct those Southern exports that have 
higher LTs.  
 
4. 2. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results to alternative measures 
of IPRs and the level of technology (LT) and examine issues related to lagged effects, 
patent quality, and emerging economies.  These are reported in Tables 6 – 8.  In 
Table 6 we replicate our sets of baseline regressions from Table 4 and 5 using EPO 
(European Patent Office) patents as a measure of LT. The regression outcomes are more 
or less consistent with those produced by the previous LT measures, leading us to draw 
the same conclusions.23 Again, the coefficients of the interaction term between LT and 
IPRs are negative and significant in the case of exports from the South to the North, 
whereas they are not significant in the case of exports from the North to the South. 
We also test for robustness using an alternative measure of IPRs that reflects 
the perception of IPR enforcement. This recent measure of IPR protection is based on 
annual surveys by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).24 The results are shown in 
Table 7A. Compared to the World Economic Forum’s IPR index, we can observe more 
variation among countries in the EIU’s IPR index, although the latter covers fewer 
countries. We have also checked the sensitivity of our results to missing and zero values 
                                           
23 The results are also robust to using patent priority filings, instead of U.S. patents granted, as a 
way of obtaining a unique count of innovations by country of inventor. 
24 In the survey, respondents rate their countries’ protection of intellectual property on a scale 
from 1 to 5, with 1 being “very poor” and 5 being “very good.” The EIU mobilizes its network 
of regional experts and pools the opinions of specific country experts to survey both the 
perceived protection of IPRs and the implementation of existing laws. 
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of LT and IPR in the sample.25 Thus far, we had excluded these observations and so we 
checked whether the results change significantly if we include them.26 These checks are 
reported in Table 7B. 
So far, for the 4 combinations (N-N, N-S, S-N, and S-S), we have run a total of 
8 regressions, as presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7A-B. In all of these 8 regressions, the 
coefficients of the interaction term in the South to North export regressions have always 
been negative and significant, and those in the North to South export regressions have 
not been significant in all the regressions, except in one. In general, the South-to-South 
trades also seem to be negatively affected by the higher IPR protection of their partner 
countries, as the coefficients are always negative but significant in 6 out of 8 cases. This 
is important, given the relatively higher level of IPR protection in the South compared 
to its generally lower level of technologies. The results of the North-North trade vary, 
with the coefficient of the interaction term being negative and significant in half the 
cases, and positive but insignificant in a couple of them. 
 Finally, in Table 8, we explore four further issues: 1) the impact of IPR on the 
emerging economies of the South with high levels of technological capabilities (LT); 2) 
the sensitivity of the results to the lagging of LT; 3) considerations of the quality of 
patents in LT; and 4) the use of non-patent measures of LT, such as the measure of 
technological sophistication of exports used in Hausmann et al. (2007). To address these 
issues, we focus on the exports of the South to the North where these issues seem most 
                                           
25 As our dependent variable has only a few zero observations at the bilateral level (6.93%), 
Tobit or Poisson Pseudo Maximum likelihood (PPML) methods do not alter our results. 
26 Where IPR data are missing for certain countries (usually they are those with gross national 
income per capita of less than $975), we assign a value to their IPR that equals the minimum 
sample score for IPR. We then also include observations with patent grants equal to zero. 
 
28 
relevant and of concern.27 
 In columns 1 – 4, we form subgroups of the Southern (developing) countries.  
In the first sub-sample, we separate the top twenty developing countries in terms of the 
level of technology, where LT is all patenting abroad, from the rest of the developing 
country sample. In a second sub-sample, we separate the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China) from the rest.  The results are consistent with our previous findings in 
Table 5.  The coefficient of the interaction term, is significantly negative.  The IPRs 
of the North are shown to impede the exports of rapidly emerging economies, such as 
the BRICs and other high LT developing economies, in a greater degree than in average 
developing countries, as the absolute value of the negative coefficient for the former 
group is bigger than for the latter group.. 
Next, in columns 5 to 8 of Table 8, we test the sensitivity of lagging the LT 
measures. It may be the case that past patenting more accurately captures the level of a 
country’s technology than its current patenting since it takes time for patented 
inventions to result in exportable products. We thus take Table 5, columns 13 and 14, as 
our baseline specifications and introduce the once and twice lagged levels of technology, 
LTt-1 and LTt-2, respectively.  The results show that even allowing for lagged effects, 
our qualitative findings remain unchanged.  
Next, in columns 9 to 12 of Table 8, we control for the quality of patents in the 
measure of the technology level of developing countries.  Mere counts may overstate 
the LT of these economies.  We adjust for patent quality in two ways.  The first is to 
select those developing country patents that are Trilateral patents, namely those patents 
that are filed in the three major markets:  the U.S., Japan, and the European Patent 
                                           
27 The results for the other blocs and directions of trade are available upon request. 
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Office (EPO) area. Trilateral patents can be viewed as relatively higher quality since 
inventors (or exporters) self-select.  Since international patenting is costly, firms select 
their most valuable technologies to patent in the trilateral markets.  Hence, the subset 
of LT that is trilateral can be a measure of high quality patents.28  The second way to 
adjust for patent quality is to weight a country’s patents by the average citations 
received in its U.S. patent grants.29 The rationale is that patents that are more heavily 
cited have greater technological impacts.  While these quality adjustments decrease the 
measured LT for developing countries, we retain our findings that Northern IPRs crowd 
out the exports of Southern economies with high levels of technology. 
Lastly, we measure the technological content of exports more directly, without 
resorting to a country’s patenting to infer the technology level. Following Hausmann et 
al. (2007), we construct a variable EXPY which measures the productivity level of a 
country’s export basket.  We first derive a measure of the sophistication of a product, 
PRODY, as a weighted average of the per-capita GDP of the countries that export it, 
where the weights are the relative comparative advantage (RCA) of each country in 
exporting the good.  We then compute EXPY as a weighted average of the PRODY in 
each country, where the weights are export shares of products.  Columns 13 – 16 show 
the results of using EXPY instead of LT in our regressions. Again, the qualitative 
results are similar; the coefficient signs of our key variables are the same, but the 
                                           
28 Data for trilateral patents come from the European Patent Office (EPO)’s PRI database. 
29 We obtained citation data and the weighted citations from the NBER’s database Patent Data 
Project (https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads). The citations 
indicator is adjusted for the truncation bias in which older patents necessarily receive more 
citations. We use the “quality-adjusted” counts of U.S. patents granted after some adjustments 
since there are many missing observations (intrinsically the patent citation is biased toward the 
North) in our sample. To minimize the observation loss, we take the time average of citations 




coefficient estimates are magnified. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigated several questions regarding the effects of an exporter’s 
technology level, an importer’s IPR, and the interactions among them on bilateral 
exports.  The first question concerned the individual or direct effect of the levels of 
either IPR protection or technology on export behavior. Consistent with previous work 
(e.g. Cassiman et al 2010; Becker and Egger 2007), we found that on average, 
technological innovations, as measured by the number of patents granted abroad or U.S 
patents, have a positive impact on exporting, and that on average, the level of IPRs 
protection by importing countries has a positive impact on exporting, controlling for 
other factors. These findings on the individual (direct) effects of the two variables 
suggest that IPR protection in a destination country helps induce exports from both 
developed and developing countries, and that innovative capacity is a strong 
determinant of the exporting of developing countries.  
Now, a hidden story behind the impact of IPRs on export behavior is revealed 
when we consider the second question, which concerns the interaction effect between 
the exporter’s technology level and the importer’s IPRs. When both of these factors are 
included as an interaction term, the effect of IPRs (or LT) on export growth involves 
both direct and indirect interaction effects, and thus is highly dependent on the level of 
an exporting country’s level of technology (or importing country’s level of IPRs). This 
paper finds that in the case of developing countries, the coefficient of the interaction 
term is negative when they export to the North; in contrast, in the case of developed 
countries exporting to the South, this coefficient is not significant. Thus, in the case of 
exports from the South to the North, the negative coefficient of the interaction effect 
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fully offsets the direct and positive effects of IPRs (or LT) on exports. Especially for 
those Southern countries whose level of technology is catching up rapidly to that of the 
North, these negative impacts tend to be bigger, which results in an overall negative 
impact of an exporter’s LT on exports, or almost a zero impact of a Northern importer’s 
IPRs on exports from the South. We have conducted a battery of robustness tests and 
found this result to arise consistently. The above results suggest that IRP protection 
creates a ‘distributional bias’ in favor of exporters from developed countries relative to 
those from developing, because strong IPRs act as an obstacle to trade, discouraging 
exporting from the South that are in the process of catching-up in terms of their level of 
technology, and in this sense as one source of the middle-income trap. 
Lastly, we suggest some ideas for future research. First, we have not 
distinguished between bilateral trade among countries with free trade agreements (FTA) 
and that among countries without such agreements. The possible FTA effect, however, 
was controlled by bilateral-pair fixed effects. The FTA among trading partners should be 
an explicit, additional factor to consider in future studies since FTAs involve both IPR 
and trade-related influences. Second, while the effects of IPR protection and 
technologies may vary by sectors, this study has not allowed such sectoral heterogeneity 
in the analysis. This requires heavier data work but should be pursued in future work. 
Third, the interesting interaction between IPRs and technology on exports can be the 
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Table 1. Gaps of Exporter’s LT and Importer’s IPR level between the Two Groups 
Variable Comparison By Group 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 
Exporter’s Average 
LT Level 
Measuring by lnLTALL 
Developing 
(the South) 
Obs. 4,908 5,818 6,028 6,263 
Mean 2.114 3.348 3.413 3.702 
Developed 
(the North) 
Obs. 5,723 5,810 5817 5,908 
Mean 6.861 7.727 7.726 7.928 
Difference (p-value) 
  -4.747*** 
(0.000) 
  -4.379*** 
(0.000) 
  -4.313*** 
(0.000) 




Measuring by lnLTUS 
Developing 
(the South) 
Obs. 4,908 5,818 6,028 6,263 
Mean 2.303 2.298 2.212 2.308 
Developed 
(the North) 
Obs. 5,723 5,810 5817 5,908 
Mean 5.939 6.025 5.882 5.988 
Difference (p-value) 
  -3.636*** 
(0.000) 
  -3.727*** 
(0.000) 
  -3.670*** 
(0.000) 






Obs. 2,502 2,871 2,896 2,957 
Mean 4.159 4.146 4.111 4.142 
Developed 
(the North) 
Obs. 2,462 2,466 2,408 2,476 










Note: The level of technology (LT) and IPRs are our main variables for regression analysis. LT level is 
measured by LTALL (Total patents granted abroad) or LTUS (Patents granted in the U.S.). The World 
Economic Forum (WEF) IPR index is used to measure the level of IPRs. 
This test is conducted with data on the bilateral-trade pairs used later on in our regression analysis (see 
the list of sample countries and their mean values of LT and IPR in the Appendix): Difference = mean 
(developing) – mean (developed). We report the p-values of the Two-group mean-comparison test, t-test 
statistics (assuming unequal variance). *, ** and *** indicate that the equality in mean values between 
developing and developed countries can be rejected at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels 
respectively. 
 




All North South 
lnLTALL lnLTUS lnLTALL lnLTUS 
1th 0.00  1.10 0.00 0.00 3.51 3.81 3.43 
25th 5.72  3.89 1.10 0.70 3.90 4.27 3.77 
50th 8.26  6.25 3.18 2.01 4.12 4.45 3.94 
75th 9.40  7.41 5.15 3.57 4.42 4.54 4.08 
99th 11.92  11.37 7.54 6.24 4.61 4.61 4.38 
S. D 2.85 2.54 2.28 1.74 0.31 0.19 0.22 
Note: S.D (Standard Deviation) presented here is to calculate and plot two-way interaction effects at 
fixed values of moderating variables (i.e. value of sample variables is demeaned). 
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Table 3.  Summary of Basic Statistics for Variables 
Variable 
All Countries Developed Countries Developing Countries 
Obs. Mean  S.D. Min Max Obs. Mean  S.D. Min Max Obs. Mean  S.D. Min Max 
lnReal Exportij (bilateral Export) 46,275 15.67 3.62 0.00 26.34 23,258 16.40 3.51 0.00 26.34 23,017 14.93 3.58 0.55 25.94 
lnLTit (Measured by Exporter’s Patents granted Abroad: ALL) 46,275 5.39 3.34 0.00 12.09 23,258 7.56 2.74 0.00 12.09 23,017 3.20 2.30 0.00 7.89 
LTit (Measured by Exporter’s Patents granted Abroad: ALL) 46,275 8,201 25,061 0.00 177,874 23,258 16,120 33,517 0.00 177,874 23,017 199 408 0.00 2,675 
lnLTit (Measured by Exporter’s US Patents granted) 46,275 4.13 2.84 0.00 11.38 23,258 5.96 2.49 0.00 11.38 23,017 2.28 1.78 0.00 6.58 
LTit (Measured by Exporter’s US Patents granted) 46,275 2,560 11,500 0.00 87,432 23,258 5,047 15,833 0.00 87,432 23,017 47 104 0.00 717 
lnIPRjt (WEF IPR Index of Importers)  21,110 4.13 0.31 3.39 4.61 9,884 4.12 0.30 3.39 4.61 11,226 4.14 0.31 3.39 4.61 
IPRjt (WEF IPR Index of Importers) 21,110 65.22 19.38 29.69 100 9,884 64.71 19.23 29.69 100 11,226 65.66 19.49 29.69 100 
lnIPRjt (EIU IPR Index of Importers) 16,218 4.07 0.46 3.00 4.61 7,484 4.05 0.47 3.00 4.61 8,734 4.08 0.46 3.00 4.61 
IPRjt (EIU IPR Index of Importers) 16,218 3.21 1.29 1.00 5.00 7,484 3.17 1.29 1.00 5.00 8,734 3.25 1.29 1.00 5.00 ln(LT) × ln(IPR) (Interaction between LTALL &IPRWEF) 21,110 20.71 14.03 0.00 55.67 9,884 30.37 11.96 0.00 55.67 11,226 12.20 9.46 0.00 36.34 ln(LT) × ln(IPR) (Interaction between LTUS &IPRWEF) 21,110 15.79 11.78 0.00 52.40 9,884 23.92 10.65 0.00 52.40 11,226 8.64 7.21 0.00 30.28 ln(LT) × ln(IPR) (Interaction between LTALL &IPREIU) 16,218 20.06 13.97 0.00 55.67 7,484 29.67 12.21 0.00 55.67 8,734 11.83 9.37 0.00 36.34 
lnEX-GPIPR-2000 (Ginarte-Park IPR index in 2000) 43,405 1.29 0.25 0.24 1.58 21,455 1.44 0.12 1.01 1.58 21,950 1.14 0.25 0.24 1.49 
EX-GPIPR-2000 (Ginarte-Park IPR index in 2000) 43,405 3.74 0.79 1.28 4.88 21,455 4.25 0.47 2.76 4.88 21,950 3.23 0.71 1.28 4.42 
lnIM-GPIPR-2000 (Ginarte-Park IPR index in 2000) 29,629 1.10 0.35 0.06 1.58 14,302 1.08 0.35 0.06 1.58 15,327 1.11 0.34 0.06 1.58 
IM-GPIPR-2000 (Ginarte-Park IPR index in 2000) 29,629 3.16 0.98 1.06 4.88 14,302 3.11 0.98 1.06 4.88 15,327 3.21 0.98 1.06 4.88 
lnRGDPit (Real GDP of Exporters) 46,275 5.20 1.65 1.66 9.47 23,258 5.70 1.51 1.97 9.47 23,017 4.70 1.62 1.66 8.09 
lnRGDPit (Real GDP of Importers) 42,504 3.38 2.39 -5.63 9.47 21,187 3.22 2.39 -5.63 9.47 21,317 3.54 2.39 -5.63 9.47 
lnDistanceij (Distance) 45,164 8.68 0.84 4.09 9.89 22,634 8.60 0.86 4.09 9.89 22,530 8.76 0.81 4.66 9.89 
Continuityij (Common Border) 45,164 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 22,634 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 22,530 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
CoLangij (Common Language) 45,164 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 22,634 0.14 0.34  0.00 1.00 22,530 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
CoLinkij (Former Colonial link) 45,164 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 22,634 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 22,530 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Note: ‘ln’ stands for the natural logarithm. Key variables such as LT and IPR are indicated both in natural logarithm and units. There are 75 export countries and 
195 import countries in the sample. Potentially, 58,200 bilateral pairs can be permutated (75 x (195-1) x 4 periods). The sample of variable is reduced to a great 
extent when some variables such as lnIPR and its interaction variables are included. Their pairs are only matched when there is no missing value in the both import 
and export side of the variables. 
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Table 4.  Impacts of LTs and IPRs on Export: all countries 
Dependent Variable:  
lnEijt (Bilateral Exports) 
      Using Patents granted Abroad: lnLTALL Using U.S. Patents granted: lnLTUS 
Pooled OLS GLS FE   GLS FE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
lnIPR)jt 
(WEF IPR Index of Importers) 
1.192*** 1.709*** 1.478*** 0.362*** 0.960*** 1.317*** 0.373*** 0.802*** 0.363*** 0.859*** 1.044*** 0.373*** 0.556** 
(0.044) (0.088) (0.099) (0.117) (0.153) (0.138) (0.116) (0.181) (0.116) (0.158) (0.142) (0.116) (0.232) 
ln(LT)it  
(ALL and US) 
0.175*** 0.606*** 0.472*** 0.009 0.502*** 0.530*** 0.008 0.362*** 0.229*** 0.752*** 0.604*** 0.215*** 0.408** 
(0.006) (0.051) (0.054) (0.010) (0.060) (0.072) (0.010) (0.084) (0.034) (0.085) (0.097) (0.033) (0.158) 
ln(IPR) x ln(LT)ijt  
(Interaction between IPR and LT)  
-0.104*** -0.079***  -0.118*** -0.116***  -0.085***  -0.126*** -0.079***  -0.047 
(0.012) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.018) (0.023)  (0.036) 
lnEX-GPIPR-2000 
(Ginarte-Park IPR index in 2000)  
 0.477***   1.301***     0.383***   
 (0.079)   (0.124)     (0.132)   
lnIM-GPIPR-2000 
(Ginarte-Park IPR index in 2000)  
 0.354***   0.830***     0.837***   
 (0.067)   (0.122)     (0.121)   
lnRGDPit  
(Real GDP of Exporters) 
0.978*** 0.981*** 0.969*** 0.352*** 0.345*** 1.039*** 0.340*** 0.334*** 0.265*** 0.260*** 0.812*** 0.258*** 0.256*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.080) (0.081) (0.023) (0.080) (0.080) (0.076) (0.076) (0.027) (0.076) (0.076) 
lnRGDPit  
(Real GDP of Importers) 
0.853*** 0.853*** 0.799*** 0.352*** 0.392*** 0.747*** 0.347*** 0.376*** 0.352*** 0.354*** 0.741*** 0.347*** 0.348*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.047) (0.048) (0.017) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.017) (0.047) (0.047) 
lnDistanceij 
(Distance) 
-1.111*** -1.124*** -1.079*** -1.514*** -1.532*** -1.132***   -1.514*** -1.525*** -1.132***   
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027)   (0.030) (0.029) (0.027)   
Continuityij 
(Common Border) 
0.562*** 0.583*** 0.538*** 0.065 0.083 0.513***   0.065 0.090 0.574***   
(0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.144) (0.141) (0.129)   (0.144) (0.142) (0.132)   
CoLangij 
(Common Language) 
0.967*** 0.994*** 0.954*** 0.599*** 0.625*** 0.945***   0.598*** 0.625*** 0.823***   
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075)   (0.074) (0.074) (0.075)   
CoLinkij 
(Former Colonial link) 
0.295*** 0.268*** 0.247*** 0.595*** 0.570*** 0.361***   0.595*** 0.579*** 0.415***   
(0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.136) (0.133) (0.124)   (0.136) (0.133) (0.126)   
Country-fixed effects 
 
  Yes Yes 
 
  Yes Yes    
Bilateral-fixed effects 
 
    
 
Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
No. of Observations. 21,110 21,110 18,543 21,110 21,110 18,543 21,110 21,110 21,110 21,110 18,543 21,110 21,110 
R-Squared (Within) 0.728 0.728 0.725 0.834 0.836 0.837 (0.133) (0.135) 0.835 0.836 0.837 (0.137) (0.137) 
Notes: * significance at 10% level, ** significance at 5% level, and *** significance at 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   
The time dummies and constants are not reported even if they are included in all specifications. Coefficient estimates for fixed/time effects are not reported. 
The level of technology is measured in two ways; column (1) ~ (8) presents the results of regression using all patents granted abroad (lnLTALL) whereas column (9) 
~ (13) uses patents granted in the U.S. (lnLTUS) as a measure of the level of technology.
 
38 
Table 5.  Impacts of LTs and IPRs on Export by Income Group 
Dependent 
Variable:  
lnEijt (Bilateral Exports) 
1. North-to-World 2. South-to-World 
lnLTALL lnLTUS lnLTALL lnLTUS 
GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lnIPR)jt 
(WEF IPR Index of Importers)
1.057*** 0.376*** 0.956*** 0.381*** 0.935*** 0.363* 0.901*** 0.377* 
(0.214) (0.116) (0.231) (0.118) (0.223) (0.195) (0.233) (0.197) 
ln(LT)it  
(ALL and US)
0.418*** 0.042*** 0.574*** 0.173** 0.811*** -0.056*** 1.304*** 0.178*** 
(0.093) (0.015) (0.146) (0.087) (0.105) (0.016) (0.172) (0.039) 
ln(IPR) x ln(LT)ijt  
(Interaction between IPR& LT)
-0.091*** -0.069*** -0.097*** -0.049 -0.209*** -0.154*** -0.267*** -0.164** 
(0.021) (0.026) (0.028) (0.054) (0.025) (0.031) (0.039) (0.073) 
lnRGDPit  
(Real GDP of Exporters) 
-0.558*** -0.547*** -0.456*** -0.445** 0.704*** 0.697*** 0.542*** 0.542*** 
(0.188) (0.185) (0.177) (0.175) (0.093) (0.093) (0.088) (0.088) 
lnRGDPit  
(Real GDP of Importers) 
0.367*** 0.366*** 0.345*** 0.348*** 0.444*** 0.406*** 0.365*** 0.347*** 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.088) (0.088) (0.086) (0.086) 
Country-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Bilateral-fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of Observations. 9,884 9,884 9,884 9,884 11,226 11,226 11,226 11,226 
R-Squared (Within) 0.879 (0.164) 0.879 (0.162) 0.797 (0.136) 0.797 (0.136) 
 
Using lnLTALL 
3. North-to-North 4.North-to-South 5.South-to-North 6.South-to-South 
GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
lnIPR)jt 
(WEF IPR Index of Importers)
1.518*** -0.021 0.498 0.832* 1.479*** 0.586** 0.440 0.543 
(0.516) (0.200) (0.354) (0.496) (0.390) (0.295) (0.325) (0.397) 
ln(LTALL)it  
(All Foreign Patents)
0.953*** 0.050** 0.131 0.345 1.958*** -0.072*** 0.646** 0.686* 
(0.326) (0.019) (0.196) (0.277) (0.393) (0.021) (0.278) (0.414) 
ln(IPR) x ln(LT)ijt  
(Interaction between IPR& LT)
-0.206*** -0.237*** -0.000 -0.059 -0.410*** -0.262*** -0.106 -0.125 
(0.071) (0.088) (0.045) (0.068) (0.089) (0.065) (0.068) (0.103) 
lnRGDPit  
(Real GDP of Exporters) 
-0.569** -0.578** -0.435* -0.394 0.576*** 0.724*** 0.513*** 0.519*** 
(0.237) (0.234) (0.250) (0.246) (0.120) (0.126) (0.128) (0.128) 
lnRGDPit  
(Real GDP of Importers) 
0.310 0.334* 0.368*** 0.371*** 0.255 0.240 0.461*** 0.455*** 
(0.198) (0.195) (0.048) (0.048) (0.305) (0.303) (0.097) (0.096) 
Country-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Bilateral-fixed effects 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of Observations. 4,190 4,190 5,694 5,694 5,071 5,071 6,155 6,155 
R-Squared (Within) 0.894 (0.266) 0.851 (0.129) 0.829 (0.153) 0.773 (0.133) 
Notes: *significance at 10% level, **significance at 5% level, and ***significance at 1% level, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The time dummies, constants and the same gravity 
control variables in Table 4 are included even if they are not reported. Independent and control variables 
of Columns (2) (4), (6) (8) and (10) (14) are demeaned for graphical analysis. lnLTALL presents the results 
where all patents granted abroad are used, whereas columns denoting lnLTus use patents granted in the 
U.S. as a measure of the level of technology. Columns (9) ~ (16) use only lnLTALL since the other 
measure produces similar implications. 
 
Directions of trade flows; 
1. North-to-World, Column (1) - (4): Exporter is developed and Importer (destination) is all countries.  
2. South-to-World, Column (5) - (8): Exporter is developing and Importer (destination) is all countries.   
3. North-to-North, Column (9) - (10): Exporter is developed and Importer (destination) is developed. 
4. North-to-South, Column (11) - (12): Exporter is developed and Importer (destination) is developing.   
5. South-to-North, Column (13) - (14): Exporter is developing and Importer (destination) is developed.   
6. South-to-South, Column (15) - (16): Exporter is developing and Importer (destination) is developing. 
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Table 6.  Impacts of LTs and IPRs on Export: Robustness check (using European Patents as a Measure of LT) 
Dependent 
Variable:  
lnEijt (Bilateral Exports) 
1.World-to-World 2.North-to-World 3.South-to-World 4.North-to-North 5.North-to-South 6.South-to-North 7.South-to-South 
GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
lnIPR)jt 
0.763*** 0.640*** 1.066*** 0.851** 0.772*** 0.765*** 0.885** 0.729 0.429 0.769* 1.227*** 1.166*** 0.497 0.680* 
(0.151) (0.206) (0.224) (0.354) (0.228) (0.252) (0.433) (0.676) (0.340) (0.461) (0.327) (0.350) (0.321) (0.363) 
ln(LT)it 
0.630*** 0.476*** 0.681*** 0.520** 1.471*** 1.393*** 0.810*** 0.687 0.142 0.407 2.324*** 2.123*** 0.923*** 1.327*** 
(0.079) (0.143) (0.126) (0.220) (0.185) (0.271) (0.274) (0.453) (0.190) (0.274) (0.398) (0.502) (0.337) (0.447) 
ln(IPR)jt x ln(LT)it 
-0.122*** -0.087*** -0.128*** -0.090* -0.337*** -0.320*** -0.162*** -0.136 0.012 -0.054 -0.521*** -0.476*** -0.206** -0.313*** 
(0.018) (0.033) (0.029) (0.051) (0.043) (0.064) (0.061) (0.101) (0.047) (0.068) (0.090) (0.113) (0.084) (0.112) 
lnGDPit 
0.296*** 0.292*** -0.419*** -0.410*** 0.590*** 0.586*** -0.376** -0.380** -0.469** -0.435* 0.606*** 0.600*** 0.577*** 0.578*** 
(0.079) (0.079) (0.154) (0.152) (0.090) (0.090) (0.187) (0.185) (0.228) (0.226) (0.123) (0.122) (0.130) (0.130) 
lnGDPjt 
0.370*** 0.363*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.407*** 0.395*** 0.321 0.353* 0.368*** 0.372*** 0.184 0.167 0.468*** 0.468*** 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.090) (0.090) (0.205) (0.204) (0.048) (0.048) (0.292) (0.290) (0.100) (0.100) 
lnDistanceij 
-1.536***  -1.487***  -1.645***  -1.251***  -1.713***  -1.589***  -1.739***  
(0.030)  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.051)  (0.080)  (0.071)  (0.063)  
Continuityij 
0.016  -0.208  0.327  -0.068  0.316  0.938**  0.090  
(0.144)  (0.173)  (0.204)  (0.164)  (0.464)  (0.414)  (0.242)  
Colanguageij 
0.630***  0.254***  0.742***  0.542***  0.165  0.454***  0.744***  
(0.075)  (0.093)  (0.114)  (0.117)  (0.138)  (0.172)  (0.160)  
Colonyij 
0.559***  0.702***  0.288  0.493***  0.740***  0.330  0.258  
(0.135)  (0.127)  (0.278)  (0.176)  (0.147)  (0.227)  (0.789)  
Country-effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Bilateral-effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 19,723 19,723 9,884 9,884 9,839 9,839 4,190 4,190 5,694 5,694 4,408 4,408 5,431 5,431 
R-squared (within) 0.842 (0.152) 0.879 (0.163) 0.807 (0.160) 0.894 (0.253) 0.851 (0.131) 0.841 (0.196) 0.778 (0.147) 
Notes: * significance at 10% level, ** significance at 5% level, and *** significance at 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   
The time dummies and constants are not reported even if they are included in all specifications. Coefficient estimates for fixed/time effects are not reported. 
 
Directions of trade flows; 
1. World-to-World, Column (1) and (2): Exporter is all countries and Importer (destination) is all countries 
2. North-to-World, Column (3) and (4): Exporter is developed and Importer (destination) is all countries. 
3. South-to-World, Column (5) and (6): Exporter is developing and Importer (destination) is all countries. 
4. North-to-North, Column (7) and (8): Exporter is developed and Importer (destination) is developed. 
5. North-to-South, Column (9) and (10): Exporter is developed and Importer (destination) is developing. 
6. South-to-North, Column (11) and (12): Exporter is developing and Importer (destination) is developed.  
7. South-to-South, Column (13) and (14): Exporter is developing and Importer (destination) is developing. 
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Table 7.  Impacts of LTs and IPRs on Export: Robustness check 
7A  Using IPR index by Economist Intelligence Unit 
Dependent 
Variable:  
lnEijt (Bilateral Exports) 
1.World-to-World 2.North-to-World 3.South-to-World 4.North-to-North 5.North-to-South 6.South-to-North 7.South-to-South 
GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE GLS FE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Country-effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Bilateral-effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
ln(IPR)jt 0.833*** 0.756*** 0.920*** 0.788*** 0.772*** 0.707*** 0.746 0.256 0.585*** 0.726*** -0.043 -0.338 0.499*** 0.581*** 
(0.089) (0.101) (0.128) (0.132) (0.123) (0.130) (0.494) (0.593) (0.178) (0.179) (0.349) (0.354) (0.163) (0.172) 
ln(LT)it  0.327*** 0.243*** 0.265*** 0.189*** 0.538*** 0.367*** 0.496*** 0.201 0.098 0.168** 0.827*** 0.318 0.184* 0.253** 
(0.041) (0.050) (0.056) (0.057) (0.079) (0.094) (0.190) (0.252) (0.073) (0.072) (0.217) (0.249) (0.109) (0.125) 
ln(IPR) x ln(LT)ijt  -0.081*** -0.060*** -0.059*** -0.041*** -0.144*** -0.103*** -0.107** -0.040 -0.019 -0.039* -0.205*** -0.090* -0.054* -0.075** 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.022) (0.042) (0.056) (0.020) (0.020) (0.048) (0.056) (0.028) (0.033) 
lnRGDPit  0.319*** 0.305*** -0.379** -0.352** 0.569*** 0.565*** -0.381* -0.390* -.0.371*** -0.317 0.672*** 0.669*** 0.478*** 0.467*** 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.167) (0.165) (0.102) (0.101) (0.206) (0.203) (0.256) (0.253) (0.138) (0.137) (0.149) (0.147) 
lnRGDPit  
0.211*** 0.187*** 0.131** 0.115* 0.317*** 0.271** -0.084 -0.082 0.291*** 0.281*** 0.085 0.078 0.504*** 0.505*** 
(0.068) (0.068) (0.062) (0.061) (0.120) (0.119) (0.159) (0.159) (0.035) (0.073) (0.291) (0.287) (0.148) (0.145) 
No. of Observations. 16,218 16,218 7,484 7,484 8,734 8,734 3,575 3,575 3,909 3,909 4,396 4,396 4,338 4,338 
R-Squared (Within) 0.830 (0.169) 0.873 (0.246) 0.785 (0.152) 0.885 (0.243) 0.857 (0.254) 0.820 (0.155) 0.770 (0.158) 
7B  Missing countries are all included 
ln(IPR)jt 0.488*** 0.496*** 0.467*** 0.443*** 0.499*** 0.541*** -0.006 -0.031 0.598*** 0.578*** 0.716** 0.722** 0.415* 0.471** 
(0.115) (0.115) (0.120) (0.120) (0.193) (0.192) (0.197) (0.194) (0.147) (0.147) (0.292) (0.290) (0.240) (0.240) 
ln(LT)it  0.040** 0.029 -0.042 -0.065 0.059** 0.049** -0.020 -0.049 -0.064 -0.076 0.034 0.025 0.072** 0.060* 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.043) (0.043) (0.025) (0.025) (0.076) (0.075) (0.054) (0.054) (0.033) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) 
ln(IPR) x ln(LT)ijt  -0.026** -0.020* 0.031 0.043 -0.072*** -0.068*** 0.022 0.038 0.044 0.048 -0.060*** -0.058*** -0.079*** -0.073*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.026) (0.012) (0.012) (0.044) (0.043) (0.034) (0.034) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) 
lnRGDPit  0.249*** 0.234*** -0.364** -0.275* 0.642*** 0.634*** -0.454* -0.427* -0.324 -0.206 0.743*** 0.754*** 0.585*** 0.565*** 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.157) (0.156) (0.074) (0.074) (0.234) (0.233) (0.200) (0.198) (0.119) (0.119) (0.094) (0.094) 
lnRGDPit  
0.136*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.144*** 0.125** 0.118* 0.460** 0.495*** 0.126*** 0.124*** -0.201 -0.245 0.180*** 0.181*** 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.044) (0.044) (0.061) (0.061) (0.188) (0.188) (0.047) (0.046) (0.238) (0.240) (0.067) (0.067) 
No. of Observations. 42,050 42,504 20,925 21,187 21,125 21,317 5,944 5,944 14,981 15,243 6,847 6,847 14,278 14,470 
R-Squared (Within) 0.803 (0.105) 0.848 (0.105) 0.758 (0.116) 0.870 (0.174) 0.811 (0.090) 0.814 (0.140) 0.718 (0.109) 
Notes: *significance at 10% level, **significance at 5% level, and ***significance at 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The time 
dummies and constants are included in all specifications even if they are not reported. For lnLT, patents granted abroad in all countries are used as a measure of the 
level of technology in all the models.
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Table 8.  Impacts of LTs and IPRs on Export: Further Robustness Check 
(Focusing on the Case of the South-to-North) 
Dependent 
Variable:  
lnEijt (Bilateral Exports) 
1. High LT Countries among the 
South (LT emerging economies) 
2. Lagging the Technology Level  
(LT at t −1 or t −2 instead of at t) 
20 Highest vs. Others BRICs v.s. Others 𝐿𝑇𝑡−1 𝐿𝑇𝑡−2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lnIPR)jt 
(WEF IPR Index of Importers)
0.780** 0.265 -0.100 0.610* 1.221*** 1.072*** 1.218*** 1.101*** 
(0.312) (0.499) (0.371) (0.328) (0.334) (0.340) (0.332) (0.338) 
ln(LTALL)it  
(ALL Foreign Patents)
-0.108*** -0.004 -0.047 -0.069*** 1.177*** 0.858*** 1.267*** 0.996*** 
(0.023) (0.044) (0.197) (0.023) (0.218) (0.249) (0.218) (0.256) 
ln(IPR)jt x ln(LT)it 
(Interaction between IPR& LT)
-0.327*** -0.284** -0.719*** -0.255*** -0.283*** -0.210*** -0.303*** -0.241*** 
(0.080) (0.137) (0.181) (0.072) (0.049) (0.057) (0.050) (0.059) 
lnRGDPit  
(Real GDP of Exporters) 
0.643*** 1.105*** 0.418 0.742*** 0.706*** 0.697*** 0.674*** 0.665*** 
(0.158) (0.219) (0.388) (0.141) (0.125) (0.125) (0.123) (0.123) 
lnRGDPit  
(Real GDP of Importers) 
-0.220 0.708 -0.236 0.292 0.258 0.277 0.260 0.278 
(0.340) (0.502) (0.433) (0.335) (0.302) (0.300) (0.302) (0.300) 
Country-fixed effects     Yes  Yes  
Bilateral-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of Observations. 2,544 2,527 528 4,543 5,071 5,071 5,071 5,071 




3. Patent Quality Considered 
(Trilateral patents & Patent citations) 
4. Alternative Measure for LT 
(using EXPY instead of Patent type) 
Trilat (US / EPO / JPO) 
patent as a measure of LT 
Average Citation & 
Weighted Citation 
EXPY based on Hausmann et al. (2007) 
World-to-World South-to-North 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
lnIPR)jt 
(WEF IPR Index of Importers)
1.259*** 0.976** 1.300*** 1.502*** 12.990*** 11.672*** 24.873*** 22.778*** 
(0.360) (0.428) (0.375) (0.400) (1.535) (1.832) (4.960) (5.370) 
ln(LT)it  
(Various measures)
1.789*** 0.926 1.540*** 1.317*** 5.935*** 5.389*** 11.574*** 10.585*** 
(0.412) (0.588) (0.326) (0.298) (0.729) (0.863) (2.397) (2.601) 
ln(IPR)jt x ln(LT)it 
(Interaction between IPR& LT)
-0.421*** -0.230* -0.329*** -0.285*** -1.344*** -1.202*** -2.630*** -2.403*** 
(0.084) (0.128) (0.073) (0.068) (0.162) (0.193) (0.533) (0.577) 
lnRGDPit  
(Real GDP of Exporters) 
0.659*** 0.651*** 0.629*** 0.629*** 0.347*** 0.334*** 0.658*** 0.648*** 
(0.124) (0.124) (0.122) (0.123) (0.079) (0.079) (0.124) (0.124) 
lnRGDPit  
(Real GDP of Importers) 
0.265 0.282 0.261 0.260 0.469*** 0.453*** 0.259 0.276 
(0.306) (0.304) (0.305) (0.305) (0.050) (0.051) (0.306) (0.304) 
Country-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Bilateral-fixed effects 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of Observations. 5,071 5,071 21,110 21,110 21,110 21,110 5,071 5,071 
R-Squared (Within) 0.827 (0.146) 0.827 0.828 0.836 (0.137) 0.828 (0.152) 
Notes: *significance at 10% level, **significance at 5% level, and ***significance at 1% level, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The time dummies, constants and the same gravity control variables in Table 4 are 
included even if they are not reported. Independent and control variables of Columns (1) to (4) are demeaned for 
statistical (or graphical) analysis. Column (1) presents the results using the top 20 developing countries in terms of LT: 
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, Malaysia, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Venezuela, Chile, Panama, Colombia, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia. Column (2) presents the results for the 
remaining 22 developing countries. Columns (3) and (4) present the regression results using the top 4 developing 
countries in terms of LT:  Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRICs), and the rest of the South, respectively. Columns 
(5) to (8) use LTt-1 and LTt-2 instead of LTt  to consider the lagged effect of LT. Recall that LT is calculated as the 
moving average of time t and t-1.  Hence, LTt-1 is a moving average of t-1 and t-2, and mutatis mutandis for LTt-2. 
 
Directions of trade flows: 
Columns from (1) to (16) are South-to-North (Exporter is a developing country and Importer is a developed country), 
except for columns (13) and (14) are World-to-World (Exporter and Importer are both all countries). The results of 
other combinations are available upon request. 
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Appendix: Country list (Average values of lnLTALL, lnIPR, and High-Tech Exports 
for 2000 ~ 2007) 
Developed 
Country (HI) 
lnLT𝑖 lnIPR𝑗 H.E*  Developing Country lnLT𝑖 lnIPR𝑗 H.E* Income 
Japan 11.87 4.42 115.06  Russia 6.87 3.70 4.35 UMI 
USA 11.64 4.57 188.84  South Africa 6.57 4.37 1.27 UMI 
Germany 11.19 4.60 119.18  Brazil 6.28 4.03 6.67 UMI 
France 10.21 4.53 64.73  Mexico 5.48 4.02 31.42 UMI 
United Kingdom 9.92 4.57 74.63  Argentina 5.18 3.82 0.82 UMI 
Rep. of Korea 9.83 4.31 70.08  Poland 5.02 3.98 2.01 UMI 
Switzerland 9.67 4.57 22.84  Turkey 4.59 3.88 1.07 UMI 
Netherlands 9.44 4.55 54.19  Malaysia 4.15 4.37 52.27 UMI 
Sweden 9.34 4.56 15.80  Bulgaria 3.61 3.78 0.27 UMI 
Italy 9.31 4.22 22.72  Romania 3.55 3.91 0.70 UMI 
Canada 9.28 4.49 26.18  Venezuela 3.22 3.62 0.11 UMI 
Finland 8.70 4.57 11.73  Chile 3.05 4.15 0.23 UMI 
Australia 8.49 4.55 3.05  Panama 2.89 4.12 0.00 UMI 
Belgium 8.39 4.45 19.02  Colombia 2.58 4.00 0.34 UMI 
Austria 8.28 4.50 11.40  Latvia 2.21 4.01 0.14 UMI 
Denmark 8.25 4.59 9.18  Costa Rica 1.87 4.09 1.68 UMI 
Israel 8.16 4.41 5.67  Uruguay 1.87 4.08 0.02 UMI 
Spain 7.67 4.30 8.68  Lithuania 1.65 4.00 0.39 UMI 
Norway 7.60 4.47 2.94  Mauritius 1.59 4.09 0.08 UMI 
Ireland 7.00 4.43 31.04  Peru 1.58 3.74 0.05 UMI 
New Zealand 6.74 4.52 0.50  Dominican Rep. 0.97 3.96 0.29 UMI 
Hungary 6.17 4.21 11.46  Namibia 0.81 4.14 0.06 UMI 
Singapore 5.52 4.55 88.03  Jamaica 0.65 4.01 0.00 UMI 
Czech Rep. 5.49 4.10 7.52  China 7.10 4.00 156.14 LMI 
Greece 5.06 4.20 0.88  India 6.92 4.09 2.81 LMI 
Hong Kong 4.83 4.44 2.77  Ukraine 6.27 3.74 0.90 LMI 
Portugal 4.82 4.34 2.31  Thailand 3.08 4.18 20.90 LMI 
Slovakia 4.30 4.10 1.27  Philippines 2.83 3.83 25.38 LMI 
Slovenia 3.66 4.28 0.72  Indonesia 2.59 4.01 5.41 LMI 
Croatia 3.44 3.93 0.56  Morocco 1.99 4.08 0.66 LMI 
Iceland 3.35 4.53 0.16  Jordan 1.65 4.31 0.05 LMI 
Estonia 2.34 4.29 1.02  Ecuador 1.63 3.72 0.05 LMI 
Trinidad & Tobago 0.86 3.92 0.03  Sri Lanka 1.44 3.98 0.07 LMI 
     Tunisia 1.44 4.30 0.33 LMI 
     Nigeria 0.86 3.83 0.01 LMI 
     El Salvador 0.84 4.04 0.07 LMI 
     Guatemala 0.80 3.78 0.08 LMI 
     Paraguay 0.36 3.54 0.01 LMI 
     Honduras 0.30 3.82 0.01 LMI 
     Nicaragua 0.16 3.74 0.00 LMI 
     Bangladesh 0.69 3.53 0.02 LI 
     Viet Nam 0.63 3.75 0.93 LI 
Note: Low-income (LI) economies are those whose Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is less than 
$975. Middle-income economies are those whose GNI per capita is more than $975 but less than $11,906. 
LMI (Lower middle-income) and UMI (upper middle-income) economies are separated at a GNI per 
capita of $3,855. HI (High-income) economies are those whose GNI per capita is $11,906 or more (World 
Bank 2010). H.E* indicates average “High-technology Exports” in billion of real dollars during 2000 ~ 




Figure 1: Trend in U.S. International Trade Commission (U.S. ITC) filings on 
‘Unfair Imports’: Increases in IPR-related Litigation in the United States 
 
Note: Year refers to September year-end (by fiscal year) 
Source: The number of Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty (AD/CVD) Investigations is compiled 
from “AD/CVD Investigation: Federal Register History” (http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats). 
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 Figure 2A: IPR’s Impact on Export dependent on ln(LT𝑖):  




Note: Y axis = ?̂?: the estimated elasticity of E (real exports) with respect to IPR𝑗, calculated as %∆E𝑖 ≈ [α + γln(LT)𝑖]%∆IPR𝑗 using the coefficients from column (14) in Table 5. 




Figure 2B: LT’s Impact on Export dependent on ln(IPRj): 




Note: Y axis = ?̂?: the estimated elasticity of E (real exports) with respect to LT𝑖, calculated as  %∆E𝑖𝑗 ≈ [β + γ ln(IPR𝑗)]%∆LT𝑖 using the coefficients from column (14) in Table 5. 
X axis = values of LT such that the low value is mean - 1 SD and the high value is mean + 1 SD. 
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Mean 
